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Abstract 
 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations examines the application of extant international law principles and 
rules to cyber activities occurring during both peacetime and armed conflict. It 
was intended by the two International Groups of Experts that drafted it to be a 
useful tool for analysis of cyber operations. The manual comprises 154 Rules, 
together with commentary explaining the source and application of the Rules. 
 
However, as a compendium of rules and commentary, the manual merely sets 
forth the law. In this article, the director of the Tallinn Manual Project offers a 
roadmap for thinking through cyber operations from the perspective of 
international law. Two flowcharts are provided, one addressing state responses to 
peacetime cyber operations, the other analyzing cyber attacks that take place 
during armed conflicts. The text explains each step in the analytical process. 
Together, they serve as a vade mecum designed to guide government legal 
advisers and others through the analytical process that applies in these two 
situations, which tend to be the focus of great state concern. Readers are 
cautioned that the article represents but a skeleton of the requisite analysis and 
therefore should be used in conjunction with the more robust and granular 
examination of the subjects set forth in Tallinn Manual 2.0.  
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Introduction 
In 2007, Estonia was the target of widespread cyber operations in response 
to its movement of a Soviet-era statue commemorating the “Great Patriotic War” 
from the center of its capital, Tallinn. The following year, cyber operations 
figured prominently in the international armed conflict between Georgia and 
Russia.1 As those incidents unfolded, it became clear that the international law 
community was ill-prepared to handle events in this new domain of conflict. 
Indeed, some commentators and states queried whether international law even 
applied to operations conducted in cyberspace. 
 
To address the analytical void, the then-newly established NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), based in Tallinn, 
launched a multiyear project to assess the cyber relevance of the international law 
governing situations involving the “use of force,” as that term is understood under 
the UN Charter and customary international law, as well as the applicability of 
international humanitarian law to cyber operations during armed conflicts. The 
project resulted in the 2003 publication of the Tallinn Manual on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.2 That year, the CCD COE commissioned a 
follow-on project to consider the peacetime legal regimes bearing on cyber 
operations. It culminated in the 2017 release of Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, which contains both the new 
material and the slightly revised text of the first edition.3  
 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 has garnered global attention as states struggle with 
complex cyber operations mounted against their governments and private cyber 
infrastructure4 by both other states and non-state actors. At the heart of this 
struggle is unfortunate uncertainty as to the applicable law. While there is no 
longer any serious debate as to whether international law applies to transborder 
cyber operations, the international community has been unable to achieve 
consensus on the precise application of many international law principles and 
rules that govern them. In great part, this is because states are conflicted.5 A 
                                                
1 For an excellent analysis of these incidents, see ENEKEN Tikk, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, 
INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14–33 (2010). 
2 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2013). 
3 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. The term cyber operations 
refers to the “employment of cyber capabilities to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. . . . 
[T]he term is generally used in an operational context.” Id. 
4 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 defines cyber infrastructure as “[t]he communications, storage, and 
computing devices upon which information systems are built and operate.” Id. at Glossary. 
5 Russia’s hack of the Democratic National Committee’s servers is paradigmatic. In that case, the 
Obama Administration condemned Russian meddling in U.S. elections as “unacceptable” and 
stated it “would not be tolerated,” but did not characterize the activity as unlawful. Moreover, the 
U.S. responses were acts of “retorsion” (see infra), which are available even without the actions to 
which they respond qualifying as “internationally wrongful acts. Clearly, the Administration 
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permissive view of international law would afford them leeway to conduct their 
operations abroad, but leave them without normative firewalls that will enhance 
their cyber security. Conversely, a permissive approach to international law’s 
application to cyberspace could serve to restrain the cyber operations of other 
states and non-state actors, but comes at the cost of tying one’s own hands. 
 
The two so-called “International Group of Experts” (one each for the 2013 
and 2017 editions) that produced the manuals operated in an environment 
designed to minimize such policy influences and concerns. The only state input 
occurred during the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored “Hague 
Process,” which facilitated unofficial feedback from over fifty states and 
international organizations on Tallinn Manual 2.0 drafts. The experts were 
therefore well-situated to provide an objective, albeit contextually informed, view 
of the international law of cyber operations. Tallinn Manual 2.0 does not answer 
every question related to these operations, but in a surprisingly large number of 
instances the International Groups of Experts achieved unanimity as to the 
applicable law and its interpretation. When consensus proved elusive, the experts 
catalogued all reasonable views on the matter, leaving it to states and the broader 
international law community to resolve over time.  
 
The drafters of Tallinn Manual 2.0 intended it to be a useful starting point 
for analysis of cyber operations. However, it is only a compendium of rules and 
accompanying commentary. The manual does not serve as a roadmap for thinking 
through cyber operations. This article seeks to begin filling that void with two 
flowcharts, one addressing state responses to peacetime cyber operations, the 
other cyber attacks that take place during armed conflicts.6 They are accompanied 
by commentary that discusses the relevant law. Together, they serve as a vade 
mecum designed to walk legal advisers and others through the analytical process 
that applies in these two situations, which tend to be the focus of most state 
concern. Users are cautioned that the article represents but a skeleton of the 
requisite analysis and therefore should be used in conjunction with the more 
robust and granular examination of the subjects set forth in Tallinn Manual 2.0. 
 
I.  State Responses to Harmful Cyber Operations 
 Whenever harmful or malicious cyber operations are launched from 
abroad against public or private cyber infrastructure, discussion quickly turns to 
the appropriate response. Unfortunately, statements by government officials and 
                                                                                                                                
understood the principle of “sovereign equality,” by which characterization of the Russian actions 
as, for instance, a breach of sovereignty would have applied equally to analogous cyber activities 
by U.S. military and intelligence operations. See THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: ACTIONS IN 
RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY AND HARASSMENT (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact-sheet-actions-response-
russian-malicious-cyber-activity-and.  
6 The flowcharts were developed by the author, Ms. Liis Vihul, CEO of Cyber Law International 
and formerly Research Scientist at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 
and Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of Viadrina-Europa University. 
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pundits are often counter-normative, a fact that tends to skew thinking as to 
whether, and if so how, the victim state should respond.  In fact, international law 
sets forth clear typology of response options, with each option—self-defense, the 
plea of necessity, countermeasures, and retorsion—having its own conditions 
precedent. The first three countenance responses that would otherwise be 
unlawful, but for the nature and consequences of the cyber operation to which 
they respond. 
 
A. Self-defense 
When considering the range of responses available to states facing harmful 
cyber operations, it is necessary to begin by determining when those operations 
rise to the level of an “armed attack” under the jus ad bellum, for an armed attack 
is the conditio sine qua non of the right to engage in self-defense. The term is 
drawn from article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides “[n]othing in 
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. . . .”7 
There is universal agreement that the right of self-defense is also of a customary 
international law character.8  
 
The right undeniably extends to armed attacks conducted by cyber means, 
a conclusion supported by the finding of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
that article 51 applies to “any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed,”9 
and by statements of states and international organizations.10 Thus, when a state is 
the target of harmful cyber operations that rise to the level of an armed attack, it 
may respond with kinetic or cyber operations that would otherwise constitute 
prohibited uses of force in violation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter and its 
customary international law counterpart.11 The challenge lies in determining 
whether a particular cyber operation amounts to an armed attack. 
                                                
7 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
8 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶¶ 176, 194 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; Oil Platforms 
(Iran v. US), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 51, 74, 76 (Nov. 6); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) 
[hereinafter Wall]. 
9 Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 39. See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, para. 
4. 
10 See, e.g., NATO, WALES SUMMIT DECLARATION, para. 72 (Sept. 5, 2014); GOVERNMENT OF 
THE NETHERLANDS, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO AIV/CAVV REPORT ON CYBER WARFARE, para. 
4 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) [hereinafter DUTCH GOVERNMENT RESPONSE], 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2012/04/26/cavv-
advies-nr-22-bijlage-regeringsreactie-en/cavv-advies-22-bijlage-regeringsreactie-en.pdf; THE 
WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND 
OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 10, 13 (2011); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. 
COUNSEL, LAW OF WAR MANUAL, para. 16.3.3 (last updated Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD 
MANUAL]. 
11 U.N. Charter art. 2(4); Nicaragua, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 187–90. On the definition of a use of force 
in the cyber context, see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, r. 69. 
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1. Armed attack  
Certain armed attack criteria are clear-cut. For example, armed attacks are 
transborder in nature.12 The paradigmatic case is a cyber operation mounted by, or 
attributable to (see below), one state against another. A transborder element also 
exists when non-state actors conduct cyber operations against a state by launching 
cyber operations remotely from another state’s territory. By contrast, the concept 
of armed attack does not extend to cyber operations that are entirely domestic in 
character, as with harmful cyber operations mounted by a hacker group operating 
from within a state against private or public assets that are also located in that 
state.  
 
In addition to having a transborder element, qualification of a cyber 
operation as an armed attack requires the resulting harm, or the harm that is 
intended to result, to reach a certain threshold of severity. It is clear that every 
armed attack at least must amount to a “use of force.” This is evident from the 
ICJ’s characterization of armed attacks as “the most grave forms of the use of 
force.”13 Yet, the precise use of force threshold is unclear. Although the 
International Group of Experts agreed that cyber operations resulting in physical 
damage or injury are unambiguously uses of force,14 no consensus could be 
reached as to when cyber operations not having those consequences qualify. It 
only agreed, based on the ICJ’s analogous finding in Nicaragua assessing state 
connections with non-state guerilla forces, that merely funding a non-state group 
that engages in forceful cyber operations is not a use of force, whereas providing 
malware and training in its use for such operations does qualify.15 To address 
operations lying beyond these limited situations, and because they could agree on 
no bright-line test, the experts proffered a catalogue of non-exclusive factors that 
states might consider when deciding whether to characterize a cyber operation as 
a use of force.16  
 
Complicating matters is the fact that the prevailing view, one consistent 
with the International Court of Justice’s approach, is that while all armed attacks 
are uses of force, only the gravest uses of force are armed attacks.17 There is no 
                                                
12 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, at para. 3. 
13 Nicaragua, supra note 8, at ¶ 191. 
14 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 69. 
15 Nicaragua, supra note 8, at ¶ 228. 
16 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 69, para. 9. The factors were based on the approach 
proposed in Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network and the Use of Force in International Law: 
Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 914 (1999). 
17 See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, paras. 550–54 (5th ed. 
2011). The United States, in what is a relatively isolated position, is of the view that the armed 
attack threshold is identical to that of the use of force. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 10, 
para. 16.3.3.1; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force, 82 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 420, 422 (1988); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-
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question that a cyber operation causing significant physical damage or injury 
qualifies as grave.18 However, this conclusion leaves unanswered the question of 
when does a cyber operation not generating such consequences rise to the armed 
attack level?  
 
The International Group of Experts concurred that the answer lies in the 
“scale and effects” of the operation, a standard drawn from the Nicaragua 
judgment.19 Unfortunately, the standard is, albeit accurate as a matter of law, of 
little practical use. It therefore will be for states, through practice and expressions 
of opinio juris, to imbue the concept of armed attack with substance through the 
development of a customary international rule.20 Presumably, states will treat 
cyber operations with very severe consequences, such as the targeting of the 
state’s economic well-being or its critical infrastructure, as armed attacks to which 
they are entitled to respond in self-defense. This will likely be the case even when 
those operations are neither destructive nor injurious.21 Yet, until that occurs with 
sufficient density, the question will remain an open one. 
 
2. Self-defense criteria  
Assuming a cyber operation crosses the armed attack threshold, a state is 
only entitled to respond in self-defense if the operation is either imminent or 
ongoing.22 The principle that states need not await the actual launch of an armed 
attack, but may act in self-defense anticipatorily, is well-accepted in international 
                                                                                                                                
Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2002), reprinted in 54 HARV. INT’L L. J. ONLINE, 4 (2012) 
[hereinafter Koh, Cyberspace].  
18 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, para. 8. 
19 Nicaragua, supra note 8, at ¶ 195. 
20 “Crystallization” of customary international law requires two elements⎯state practice (usus) 
and the conviction that said practice is engaged in, or refrained from, out of a sense of legal 
obligation (opinio juris). See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 
1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27 (June 3). On the requirements of customary international law, see North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Germ. v. Denmark; Germ. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
See also Int’l Law Ass’n, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary 
(General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, London (2000); see 
generally Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties, 
322 Recueil des Cours (2006). 
21 In this regard, see the DUTCH GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 10, at 5, which adopted the 
conclusion of the Advisory Council on International Affairs that “if there are no actual or potential 
fatalities, casualties or physical damage,” a cyber operation targeting “essential functions of the 
state could conceivably be qualified as an ‘armed attack’ . . . if it could or did lead to serious 
disruption of the functioning of the state or serious and long-lasting consequences for the stability 
of the state.” Advisory Council on International Affairs (Cyber Warfare, No. 77, AIV / No 22, 
CAVV, at 21 (Dec. 2011). See also Koh, Cyberspace, supra note 17, at 4 [“In assessing whether 
an event constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors including 
the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the action (recognizing challenging issues of 
attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible 
issues.”], and U.K. Government Response to House of Commons Defence Committee’s Sixth 
Report of Session 2012–13, para. 10 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
22 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 73. 
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law,23 although the point at which a prospective armed attack becomes imminent 
is not entirely settled. Traditionally, the standard was understood in terms of 
temporal proximity to the armed attack.24 That standard may have been palatable 
in the past with respect to conventional operations, for the preparations for an 
attack were often observable by the target state, but it makes little sense in the 
context of cyber operations, which may be executed in milliseconds, with little 
warning and devastating effect. 
 
Considering this reality, the better approach is reflected in what has 
become known as “the last window of opportunity” standard.25 It requires the 
confluence of three factors. First, the prospective attacker must have the 
capability to mount a cyber operation at the armed attack level. Second, the 
attacker must intend to do so. The third requirement lies at the standard’s heart. It 
allows the prospective victim of a forthcoming attack to employ defensive force, 
whether it be kinetic or cyber in character, only at the point that a failure to do so 
would forfeit its opportunity to effectively defend itself—in other words, in the 
state’s last window of opportunity.26  
 
Consider a situation in which a state has highly reliable evidence that 
another state is going to mount devastating cyber operations against it at some 
indefinite point in the near future. The state has drawn the reasonable conclusion 
that it will be unable to effectively foil the operations once they have commenced. 
In these circumstances, and without prejudice to other requirements of 
international law, the state may treat the armed attack as imminent and act to 
preempt it. It must be cautioned that the absence of any of the three 
                                                
23 See, e.g., DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188–189 (1958). 
Although imprecise as a strict matter of law, the right to act anticipatorily in self-defense is 
traditionally said to be reflected in the celebrated nineteenth century Caroline incident. Letter from 
Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 2 INT’L L. DIG. 412 (John Bassett 
Moore ed., 1906). See also Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, 
Germany (Sept. 30, 1946), in 22 The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 435 (1950). 
24 See generally Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence: Anticipation, Pre-
emption, Prevention and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING 
THE FAULTLINES 113 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). 
25 See discussion at TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 73, paras. 4–5. For a state’s adoption of 
the standard, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION 
DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL–QA’IDA OR 
AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 7 (n.d), 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. An early 
proposal of the standard by the author was first set forth in Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive 
Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 534–36 (2003) [hereinafter Preemptive 
Strategies].  
26 The approach was developed by the author in Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational 
Terrorism under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 157 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic, eds., 
2007). 
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aforementioned preconditions will render defensive action at the use of force level 
merely “preventive,” and therefore unlawful.27 
 
Actions in self-defense against a cyber armed attack must not be solely 
retaliatory. By the requirement of immediacy, once an armed attack is over, the 
right to engage in self-defense is extinguished.28 Although this would appear to be 
an oft-insurmountable hurdle to acting in self-defense because cyber attacks can 
last mere moments, the requirement must be interpreted with sensitivity to the 
context in which it applies. Therefore, if the target state reasonably concludes that 
its attacker intends to conduct further cyber operations at the armed attack level, it 
may treat the operations in their entirety as an ongoing campaign against which it 
may take defensive action at any point. 
 
A state that has been the victim of a cyber armed attack that is no longer 
underway and is unlikely to be repeated as one event in a campaign is not left 
without remedies. In such cases, the armed attack is certain to have constituted an 
“internationally wrongful act”29 (unlawful under international law) for which 
reparations are likely available. Reparations include restitution, compensation, 
and satisfaction.30 It should be noted that countermeasures (see below) may be 
taken to ensure that a state responsible for commission of an internationally 
wrongful act complies with any obligation to provide reparation.31 
 
If hostile cyber operations at the armed attack level are imminent or 
ongoing, the victim state must next ascertain by whom the operations will be, or 
are being, conducted. When the author of the attack is another state, the victim 
state may respond forcefully in self-defense so long as doing so is consistent with 
the criteria of necessity and proportionality. These requirements have been 
acknowledged by the International Court of Justice and are accepted as customary 
in nature.32  
 
A forceful response to a malicious cyber operation is “necessary” when 
non-forceful measures will not suffice to address the armed attack. For instance, if 
passive cyber defenses are effectively foiling the attack, the victim state may not 
                                                
27 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 73, para. 10.  
28 Id., r. 73 and r. 73, at paras. 12–13. 
29 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 14; Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2, GA Res. 56/83 annex, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 
2001) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. The Articles on State Responsibility are not 
binding law of themselves, but rather represent, in great part, an authoritative restatement of 
customary international law by the International Law Commission.  
30 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 29; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, 
arts. 34–37. A state responsible for an internationally wrongful act may also be obligated to 
provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 27; 
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 30(b);  
31 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 49(1). 
32 See discussion of these requirements at TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 72. See also 
Nicaragua, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 176, 194; Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8, at ¶ 41; Oil Platforms, 
supra note 8, at ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76; Nuremburg Tribunal judgment, supra note 23, at 435. 
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launch cyber or kinetic responses that would amount to a use of force. Whereas 
the criterion of necessity deals with whether a forceful response is required to put 
an end to the harmful cyber operations, the proportionality criterion governs the 
scale and scope of that response.33 A response that is clearly excessive relative to 
that needed to effectively defend against the armed attack is unlawful. As an 
example, if an attack may be defeated by conducting counter cyber or kinetic 
attacks against the cyber infrastructure from which it is being launched, it would 
be unlawful to conduct widespread operations at the use of force level against 
cyber infrastructure throughout the attacker’s state.  
 
3. Non-state actors.  
Situations in which a non-state actor conducts harmful cyber operations at 
the armed attack level of severity against one state from another state’s territory 
are legally more challenging. If the group is acting on behalf of a state, or a state 
is “substantially involved” in the operations, the victim state may treat the 
operations as an armed attack by the former state and employ necessary and 
proportionate cyber or kinetic force against both it and the group.34 However, the 
law is unsettled as to situations in which non-state groups act on their own accord. 
Most members of the International Group of Experts took the position that their 
operations may, as a matter of law, qualify as armed attacks against which victim 
states may respond forcefully pursuant to their right of self-defense.35 This view is 
supported by state practice in the non-cyber context36 and has expressly been 
adopted by a number of states, including the United States, with respect to cyber 
attacks. 37 
  
In the estimation of the remaining experts, the right of self-defense is 
limited to situations in which the harmful cyber operations are conducted by, or 
attributable to, a state.38 Advocates of this view typically cite the International 
Court of Justice’s Wall advisory opinion and its judgment in the Congo v. Uganda 
as support.39 In those cases, the ICJ, in the face of dissent from a number of its 
judges, seemed to suggest that absent attribution of a non-state group’s activities 
                                                
33 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 72. 
34 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, paras. 16–17; Nicaragua, supra note 8, at ¶ 195. 
35 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, at paras. 19–20. 
36 See, e.g., SC Res. 1368, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); SC Res. 1373, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council 
(Sept. 12, 2001); Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Res. 1, Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OAS Doc. RC.24/RES.1/01 
(Sept. 21, 2001). 
37 See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 10, at para. 16.3.3.4; see also, e.g., DUTCH GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSE, supra note 10, at 5. 
38 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, at para. 19. 
39 Wall, supra note 8, at ¶ 139; Armed Activities in the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 146–47 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities].  
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 8 250 
to a state, the law of self-defense is inapplicable.40 By this approach, a state facing 
even destructive or injurious cyber operations by a non-state actor may not rely on 
self-defense to justify a forceful response. Instead, it would have to base its 
response on another ground, such as protection of life under international human 
rights law.41 
 
Assuming arguendo that a non-state actor’s cyber operations may qualify 
as a cyber attack, the question remains as to whether a victim state may strike 
back at the group when it is operating from another state’s territory without 
violating the latter’s sovereignty or otherwise committing an internationally 
wrongful act. Here, the majority took the position, one asserted most forcefully by 
the United States, that conducting cyber operations into the territorial state to 
terminate a non-state actor’s armed attack is permissible when the territorial state 
consents to such operations or is either “unable” or “unwilling” to put an end to 
the offending cyber operations.42 The minority countered that such situations do 
not merit piercing the thick veil of sovereignty.43 
 
When a single individual conducts harmful cyber operations at the armed 
attack level on behalf of a state, the attack may be attributed to the state for the 
purposes of the law of self-defense.44 However, the International Group of 
Experts split over situations involving non-attributable cyber operations. Some of 
the experts took the view that self-defense against the individual is permissible, 
whereas others argued that the only lawful response is to be found in the law 
governing law enforcement.45 
 
To summarize, pursuant to the law of self-defense, a forceful response, 
whether by cyber or other means, is unavailable in situations in which the hostile 
cyber operations do not reach the armed attack threshold. This is so even though 
                                                
40 See, e.g., Wall, supra note 8, at ¶ 33 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. at 229–30, ¶ 35 
(separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id. at 242–43, ¶ 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); 
Armed Activities, supra note 39, at ¶ 11 (separate opinion of Judge Simma). 
41 See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, (Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx. 
42 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, at paras. 25-26. On the U.S. position vis-à-vis the 
unwilling/unable approach, see Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 
23, 2014); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University 
(May 23, 2013); Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for 
the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active 
Hostilities (May 23, 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 1–2. For 
academic treatment of the subject, see Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a 
Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012). For earlier 
treatment of the issue by the author, see Preemptive Strategies, supra note 25, at 540–43 (2003).  
43 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, at para. 25. See also IAN BROWNLIE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 299–301 (1963). 
44 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, at para. 17. 
45 Id., r. 71, at para. 20. 
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those operations may violate other aspects of international law, such as the 
requirement to respect the sovereignty of other states,46 the principle of non-
intervention,47 and the prohibition of the use of force. 
 
B. The Plea of Necessity 
In such cases, the plea of necessity may be available as the basis for 
responding. In the vernacular of the law of state responsibility, necessity (as the 
term in used in this context rather than that of self-defense) is a “circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness.”48 It allows a state finding itself in a qualifying situation 
to respond in a manner that would otherwise be unlawful, as with a hack back that 
would violate the sovereignty of the state into which it is conducted.49 An 
example would be a situation in which a terrorist group is launching operations 
from states that are powerless to act, perhaps because they lack the technical 
wherewithal to do so. Even though a target state’s response against the group 
would otherwise be unlawful because of the response’s effects in the other states, 
it may act pursuant to the plea of necessity so long as certain criteria described 
below are met. 
 
The plea of necessity applies only to situations in which a cyber operation 
creates a “grave and imminent peril” to an “essential interest” of the state 
concerned,50 although the harmful cyber operation on which the plea is based 
need not be an internationally wrongful act. This customary law remedy51 is an 
acknowledgement that states should not be left without a viable response option in 
acute circumstances.  
 
“Grave” peril suggests harm that is especially detrimental,52 while 
“imminent” confirms that the state need not wait until said harm manifests, but 
instead may act anticipatorily.53 “Essential” refers to a particularly important 
interest of the state and, accordingly, would rule out resort to the plea of necessity 
in most situations involving malicious cyber operations. The International Group 
                                                
46 Id., rr. 1–5. 
47 Id., rr. 66–67. 
48 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, ch. V, art. 25. 
49 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, r. 26.  
50 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 25(1)(a). 
51 The principle of necessity has been expressly or impliedly cited by international tribunals and 
arbitral bodies on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Wall, supra note 8, ¶ 140; Rainbow Warrior (NZ 
v. Fr.), 20 RIAA 217, ¶ 78 (Arb. Trib. 1990); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, decision on liability, ¶¶ 201–66 (Oct. 3, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentina, award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶¶ 304–394 (May 12, 2005); Enron Co. v. 
Argentina, award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 288–345 (May 22, 2007); Sempra Energy Int’l 
v. Argentine Republic, award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 325–39 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
52 See, e.g., discussion in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 51 
(Sept. 25) [hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros]. 
53 Id. at ¶ 54. 
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of Experts described such an interest as “one that is of fundamental and great 
importance to the State concerned.”54  
 
Necessity determinations are always contextual.55 To illustrate, an 
operation targeting cyber infrastructure that supports the provision of medical care 
would not qualify as creating “grave” peril when sufficiently redundant systems 
exist to ensure the continued treatment of the population. Yet, if the healthcare 
system lacks resiliency, the operation may pose a significant risk to the 
population’s well-being, thereby rendering the situation grave.  
 
Assessments of essentiality are similarly contextual. In particular, it is 
difficult to characterize specific categories of infrastructure as essential in the 
abstract. Again, consider healthcare cyber infrastructure. A cyber operation could 
target aspects of that infrastructure that do not directly and severely impact the 
care of the population, as with that used for routine medical appointment 
scheduling. On the other hand, cyber operations could be directed at blood banks 
during a natural disaster with ensuing significant loss of life. In the first case, the 
effect on the healthcare infrastructure has not reached the essentiality threshold; in 
the second instance, it arguably has.  
 
A state’s formal designation of cyber infrastructure as “critical 
infrastructure”56 is insufficient to render it essential for the purposes of the plea of 
necessity; the function it performs when viewed in light of the attendant 
circumstances at the time it is targeted drives the determination. As an example, 
the Department of Homeland Security’s designation of election cyber 
infrastructure as critical infrastructure did not, per se, satisfy the essentiality 
requirement. Essentiality is a factual determination. Although it can be fairly 
argued that the integrity of the national electoral process is an essential interest of 
the United States, that is not a determination left to the U.S. government as a 
matter of international law.57 
 
Even in situations in which cyber operations pose a grave and imminent 
threat to an essential interest of the state, the plea of necessity is subject to strict 
limitations. International law seeks to balance the rights and obligations of states, 
for they enjoy sovereign equality. Therefore, before the state may resort to the 
plea of necessity to justify a response that would otherwise be unlawful, that 
response must be the only means available to adequately safeguard the interest in 
                                                
54 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 26, para. 2. 
55 Id., r. 26, para. 2; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 25, para. 15. 
56 “Critical infrastructure” includes “[p]hysical or virtual systems and assets of a State that are so 
vital that their incapacitation or destruction may debilitate a State’s security, economy, public 
health or safety, or the environment.” See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, at Glossary.  
57 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the 
Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-
infrastructure-critical. 
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question.58 The response, moreover, may not affect the essential interest of any 
other state in a grave and imminent way.59 In other words, states are precluded 
from addressing necessity situations if doing so would place any other state in 
comparable peril. 
 
Despite the limitations, a major practical benefit of the plea of necessity is 
that actions based on the plea may be taken when a non-state group has mounted 
harmful cyber operations. There need be no relationship between the group and 
another state or attribution to another state if such attribution cannot be reliably 
confirmed. Actions may even be taken when the author of the operation is 
altogether unknown.60 This distinguishes responses based on the plea of necessity 
from countermeasures, which are only available when the cyber operations to 
which they respond are conducted by, or otherwise attributable to, another state.61  
 
C. Countermeasures 
Countermeasures are responses by a state to the unlawful cyber operations 
of, or attributable to, another state that would be unlawful themselves but for the 
latter’s conduct.62 Their sole permissible purpose is to cause the latter (the 
“responsible state”) to desist in wrongful cyber activities against the former (the 
“injured state”); retaliation and retribution are not motives that preclude the 
wrongfulness of a response.63 Moreover, unlike operations based on necessity, 
countermeasures may only be conducted in response to internationally wrongful 
acts, which are actions or omissions that are both attributable to a state as a matter 
of law and breach an obligation owed another state.64 Thus, whereas the plea of 
necessity precludes the wrongfulness of responses vis-à-vis states that are not 
responsible for having violated an obligation owed the injured state, or when 
                                                
58 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 26; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 
25(1)(a). 
59 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 26, para. 2; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, 
art. 25(1)(b). The author’s views on the subject are set forth in Michael N. Schmitt and 
Christopher Pitts, Cyber Countermeasures and Effects on Third Parties: The International Legal 
Regime, 14 BALTIC YB INT’L L. 1 (2014). 
60 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 26, para. 11. 
61 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 20, para. 7. 
62 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 20; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 22. 
See also Nicaragua, supra note 8, ¶ 249; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 52, ¶¶ 82–83; 
Responsibility of Germany for Damage Caused in the Portuguese Colonies in the South of Africa 
(Naulilaa Arbitration) (Port. v. Ger.), 2 RIAA 1011, 1025–1026 (1928) (unofficially translated) 
[hereinafter Naulilaa]; Responsabilité de l’Allemagne en raison des actes commis postérieurement 
au 31 juillet 1914 et avant que le Portugal ne participât à la guerre (‘Cysne’) (Port. v. Ger.), 2 
RIAA 1035, 1052 (1930); Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fra.), 18 RIAA 416, 
¶¶ 80–96 (1979) [hereinafter Air Services]. For the author’s views on countermeasures and 
attribution, see Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The 
Countermeasures Response Option and International Law,” 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697–732 (2014). 
63 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 21; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 
49(1). 
64 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 2. 
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responsibility cannot be established, countermeasures are limited to taking action 
against responsible states. The key is attribution. 
 
1. Attribution  
It is necessary to distinguish between factual and legal attribution. Factual 
attribution refers to the degree of certainty that another state, or an entity for 
which that state is responsible, has launched the cyber operation. In international 
law, determinations of states as factual matters typically must be “reasonable,” 
but there is no requirement that states be correct.65 A majority of the International 
Group of Experts agreed that this is not the case with respect to countermeasures. 
States that take cyber or other countermeasures do so at their own risk.66 Should a 
state misattribute a cyber operation to another state and take countermeasures in 
response thereto, it will itself be responsible for having committed an 
internationally wrongful act. 
 
Legal attribution occurs pursuant to the law of state responsibility.67 States 
are obviously legally responsible in international law for the acts of their organs, 
such as the armed forces, security services, and intelligence agencies.68 Similarly, 
states are responsible for the acts of persons or entities that have been empowered 
under domestic law to exercise elements of governmental authority,69 as in the 
case of a private cyber security company that a state has contracted to engage in 
cyber law enforcement activities like gathering evidence for criminal prosecution. 
In both of these cases, the acts are attributable to the state concerned even if they 
are ultra vires, that is, they exceed the actor’s authority or contravene its 
instructions.70 
 
In certain circumstances, the acts of other states or international 
organizations also may be attributable to a state.71 Most attention in the cyber 
                                                
65 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 71, para. 23.  
66 Id., r. 20, para. 16; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 49, para. 3. The logic 
behind the difference is that countermeasures open the door to responses that would otherwise be 
unlawful. Other states should not be required to bear the risk of mistake, even reasonable ones, 
given this fact. However, at the armed attack level, the consequences of failing to act are severe 
enough that international law countenances the risk of mistake by only requiring states to act 
reasonably in the circumstances. 
67 For the author’s views on attribution, see Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, Proxy Wars in 
Cyber Space: The Evolving International Law of Attribution, I(II) FLETCHER SECURITY REV. 55 
(2014). 
68 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 15; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 
4(1). 
69 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 15; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 5. 
70 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 15, para. 12; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 
29, art. 7. 
71 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 16; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 6, 
para. 1. On the responsibility of a state for an internationally wrongful act associated with an 
international organization, see Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 31, para. 9. On the 
responsibility of international organizations, see Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011). 
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context, however, surrounds the attribution of a non-state actor’s cyber 
operations. Attribution attaches in two circumstances. The first is when a state 
acknowledges and adopts the operations of the non-state actor as its own.72 In this 
relatively unlikely situation, the state not only endorses the non-state actor’s cyber 
operations but also acts to render them the actions of the state itself. Consider a 
hacker group that is conducting cyber operations against a state. Another state that 
not only backs the operations, but takes affirmative measures to perpetuate them, 
either by action or through omission, will bear responsibility for the acts of the 
group. This possibility was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the 
Tehran Hostages case, where the government of Iran embraced the acts of the 
group holding American consular staff hostage and, through actions and 
omissions, made possible continued detention.73 
 
Much more likely is a scenario in which a state “instructs or directs or 
controls” cyber operations launched by a non-state group or by individuals.74 
Attribution based on instructions differs from the attribution based on 
empowerment under domestic law in that there is neither a requirement of legal 
authorization nor a limitation to actions that constitute the exercise of 
governmental authority. Rather, the state need only instigate the individuals to act 
on its behalf, for instance as an auxiliary to perform certain cyber operations such 
as striking particular cyber targets.75  
 
This more likely attribution scenario involves a non-state group operating 
under the direction or control of a state. Although the term “direction or control” 
is technically disjunctive,76 direction and control are usually expressed ensemble 
as “effective control.”77 A state is in effective control of the actions of a non-state 
group when it can exercise the requisite degree of authority over the group’s acts, 
both in terms of engaging in activities or refraining from them. As noted in the 
commentary to the relevant Article on State Responsibility, a state will only be 
                                                
72 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r.17(b); Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 
11. 
73 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (May 
24). 
74 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r.17(a); Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 8. 
See also Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/68/98*, para. 23 (June 
24, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 GGE Report]; Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in 
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN 
Doc. A/70/174, para. 28(f) (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 GGE Report]. 
75 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r.17, para. 4. 
76 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 8, para. 7. 
77 Nicaragua, supra note 8, ¶ 115; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 
108, ¶ 400 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide Case]. See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r.17, 
para. 5; JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 146 (2013). The notion 
of control in the state responsibility context must not be confused with that of “overall control,” 
which deals with characterization of an armed conflict as “international.” Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber judgment, ¶¶ 131–40, 145, 162 (Intl’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia 15 July 1999) [hereinafter Tadic, Appeals Chamber judgment]. 
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responsible on this basis if it “directed or controlled the specific operation and the 
conduct complained of was an integral part of that operation. The principle does 
not extend to conduct which was only incidentally or peripherally associated with 
an operation and which escaped from the State’s direction or control.”78 This 
threshold is not reached when the state simply assists the non-state actor’s cyber 
operations by, for instance, providing financing, malware or training,79 although 
such activities themselves may constitute an internationally wrongful act, such as 
intervention.80 
 
2. Breach of Legal Obligation  
If the cyber operation is attributable to a state, it must next be asked 
whether the state is in breach of an international legal obligation. That obligation 
may be based in either treaty or customary law and may consist of either action or 
omission. For instance, pursuant to the law of the sea, vessels of one state may 
pass through the territorial waters of another state in innocent passage so long as 
they do not engage in activities inconsistent with such passage,81 such as 
conducting cyber espionage against the coastal state. Although espionage is not 
unlawful per se,82 engaging in it during innocent passage is an internationally 
wrongful act.83 Thus, if a warship of one state conducts the cyber espionage 
operations while in the territorial sea of another, those operations are both 
attributable to the first state—because the warship is a state vessel—and a breach 
of its obligation to transit territorial waters innocently. The coastal state may 
respond with countermeasures. 
 
As this example illustrates, cyber operations are subject to rules from 
many different international law regimes. For instance, many cyber operations 
involve the use of space assets, thereby implicating space law.84 Similarly, cyber 
espionage may implicate the international human right of privacy,85 while a 
state’s imposition of controls on cyber activities can implicate the right to 
freedom of expression.86  
                                                
78 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 8, para. 3 of commentary. 
79 Nicaragua, supra note 8, ¶ 115. 
80 Id. at ¶ 242; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 66.  
81 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 19, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
82 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 32. 
83 Id., r. 48.  
84 Id., ch. 10. 
85 Id., r. 35, para. 6. On the right to privacy, see, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 
12, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]; Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The 
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014). 
86 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 35, paras. 2–4. On the right to freedom of expression, see 
UDHR, supra note 83, art. 19; ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 19(2); European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 9, June 27, 1981, 21 ILM 58, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22. 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of 
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However, perhaps the breach most likely to open the door to 
countermeasures is a violation of the sovereignty of the state in which, or into 
which, another state’s cyber operations are conducted.87 The International Group 
of Experts agreed that using cyber means to cause physical damage or injury in 
another state generally amounts to a breach of that state’s sovereignty.88 It makes 
no difference whether the injury or damage is the result of targeting public or 
private cyber infrastructure. The experts likewise agreed that an operation that 
permanently affects the functionality of cyber infrastructure may constitute a 
breach of sovereignty,89 whereas mere espionage, without more, does not.90 The 
group could not, however, come to agreement over cyber operations lying 
between these two extremes. For example, there was no consensus with respect to 
merely causing cyber infrastructure to operate in a manner in which it was not 
intended to operate. Similarly, there was disagreement over the mere placement of 
malware in a system located in another state.91 However, the experts did concur 
that a cyber operation interfering with or usurping another state’s inherently 
governmental function, such as law enforcement, is a sovereignty violation 
irrespective of whether damage or injury results.92 
 
3. Conditions on Countermeasures  
Because they involve an act that would otherwise be unlawful, 
countermeasures are subject to strict conditions. Several merit mention. First, 
countermeasure may not be conducted until the injured state has notified the 
responsible state that it intends to take countermeasures and gives the responsible 
state an opportunity to desist in its unlawful conduct.93 In the cyber context, it is 
important to point out that the notification requirement is subject to a condition of 
feasibility, for advance notification that a cyber countermeasure is about to be 
                                                                                                                                
Opinion and Expression, para. 12, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011); Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, para. 11, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015).  
87 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, ch. 1. The classic definition of sovereignty is at Island of 
Palmas (Neth. v. US) 2 RIAA 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). It should be noted that the former 
General Counsel for the Department of Defense has questioned the status of sovereignty as a 
primary rule, rather than merely a general principle of international law. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 
Office of the Gen. Counsel, International Law Framework for Employing Cyber Capabilities in 
Military Operations (Jan. 19, 2017) (on file with author). This position is contrary to the finding of 
the International Group of Experts, see Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 17; consideration of 
breaches of sovereignty by the International Court of Justice, see Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 
1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); and conclusions set forth in other documents prepared in international fora, 
see, e.g., 2013 GGE Report, supra note 70, para 20; 2015 GGE Report, supra note 70, paras. 27, 
28(b)). 
88 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 4, paras. 11–13. 
89 Id., para. 13. 
90 Id., para. 7. 
91 Id., para. 14. 
92 Id., para. 15–18. 
93 Id., r. 21, paras. 10–11; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 52(1). See also 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 52, ¶ 84; Air Services, supra note 62, ¶¶ 85–87. 
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taken may afford the responsible state the opportunity to foil it.94 Second, 
countermeasures must be proportionate to the injury to which they respond.95 In 
particular, they have to be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into 
account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the right question.”96 
Third, treaties may contain provisions for the taking of specified remedies in the 
event of breach. If so, the injured state must resort to them before taking 
countermeasures.97 
 
It is operationally relevant that countermeasures need not be in-kind nor 
directed at the entity that authored the internationally wrongful act.98 An injured 
state may respond with cyber measures, such as cyber operations that violate the 
sovereignty of the responsible state, to internationally wrongful acts that do not 
involve cyber, and vice versa. Returning to the law of the sea to illustrate the 
point, a state that has been targeted by another state’s unlawful cyber operations 
would be entitled to close its territorial sea to vessels of the responsible state 
transiting in innocent passage. Or consider the case of a state’s security organs 
that conduct unlawful cyber operations against government cyber infrastructure in 
another state. The injured state would be entitled to respond by directing cyber 
operations at private corporations in the responsible state, so long as the 
operations complied with the requirements for countermeasures, such as 
proportionality. 
 
Of course, a state need not take countermeasures in response to an 
internationally wrongful act. Responses qualifying as retorsion (“unfriendly” acts 
that do not violate international law) are always available.99 The expulsion of 
diplomats and imposition of economic sanctions following allegations of Russian 
government hacking intended to interfere with U.S. elections qualified as 
retorsion.100 There was therefore no need as a matter of law to establish that the 
Russian interference in the election amounted to an internationally wrongful act, 
such as intervention. 
 
Recall that countermeasures may not be taken against anyone other than a 
responsible state. In certain cases, a state may respond to malicious cyber 
operations that are not attributable to another state by reference to the obligation 
                                                
94 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 21, paras. 11–12; Articles of State Responsibility, supra 
note 29, art. 52(2). 
95 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 23; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 51; 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 52, ¶ 85; Naulilaa, supra note 62, at 1028. 
96 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 31. 
97 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 20, para. 13; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 
29, art. 50, para. 10 
98 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 23, para. 7. 
99 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 20, para. 4; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, 
chapeau to Chapter II of Part 3, para. 3. 
100 The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on Actions in 
Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/statement-president-actions-
response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity. 
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of due diligence. Pursuant to that principle, states are obligated to ensure that 
cyber operations having serious adverse consequences for other states are not 
mounted from their territory or conducted remotely using cyber infrastructure 
located therein.101 The obligation is limited to putting an end to ongoing activities 
that come to the notice of the territorial state. There is no obligation to take 
preventive measures to ensure the cyber hygiene of cyber infrastructure located 
on the state’s territory,102 nor any duty to monitor that infrastructure to identify 
harmful operations.103 However, once harmful operations come to the attention of 
a territorial state—for instance because the target state notifies it of them—the 
former state must take all reasonable and feasible measures in the circumstances 
to put an end to the operations.104 If it fails to do so, it has breached the principle 
of due diligence and therefore has committed an internationally wrongful act vis-
à-vis the target state. 
 
Take the case of harmful cyber operations conducted against one state by a 
non-state actor operating from another state. A breach of the due diligence 
obligation by the territorial state would allow the injured state to respond with 
countermeasures designed to compel the former to put an end to the operations 
conducted from its territory and thereby come into compliance with its due 
diligence obligation. Since countermeasures need not be in kind or directed 
against the author of the internationally wrongful act, the injured state’s 
countermeasures could take the form of cyber operations against the non-state 
actors. Technically, the “object” of the countermeasures would be the territorial 
state, not the non-state actors.105 
 
Such an action is often compared to the “unwilling and unable” approach 
to conducting extraterritorial self-defense against non-state actors on the territory 
of other states discussed above. There is an important difference, however. 
Countermeasures are only available when the state from which the non-state 
actors are operating can address the situation but elects not to do so. This is 
because the obligation is one of conduct, not result.106 A state that unsuccessfully 
                                                
101 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 6. On the principle, see United States v. Arjona, 120, U.S. 
479, 483 (1887); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Moore, J., 
dissenting); Island of Palmas, supra note 87, at 839; Corfu Channel, supra note 87, at 22; UN 
Secretary-General, Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the 
International Law Commission, para. 57, UN Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (Feb. 1, 1949); Permanent 
Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations, General Appreciation of the 
Issues of Information Security, at 4, Note No. 516/2012; 2013 GGE Report, supra note 72, paras. 
67–68; Nicaragua, supra note 8, ¶ 157. 
102 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 7, paras. 7–8, a conclusion based in part on the 
International Court of Justice’s Genocide judgment, see Genocide case, supra note 77, at ¶ 431. 
103 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 7, para. 10. 
104 Id., r. 7. 
105 For the author’s explication of the approach, see Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due 
Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J. F. 68 (2015). 
106 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 7, para. 24. The state must, however, exhaust all feasible 
measures at its disposal. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 29, cmt. to art. 12, paras. 11–
12; Genocide case, supra note 77, at ¶ 430. 
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attempts to put an end to the cyber operations of the non-state actors, or that 
makes no attempt to do so because it lacks the technical wherewithal, is not in 
breach of its due diligence obligation, and accordingly cannot be the object of 
countermeasures. The state being targeted by the non-state actor’s cyber 
operations would be limited to engaging in law-enforcement. 
 
4. Responses by private entities  
The analysis set forth above speaks to responses by states. With the 
notable exception of self-defense, public international law does not address 
actions by non-state actors with any granularity. For instance, only cyber 
operations attributable to states violate the sovereignty of other states. Similarly, 
the cyber operations of states may violate international law prohibitions on 
intervention and the use of force, but those of non-state actors do not unless 
attributable to a state. The latter can violate the domestic law of states enjoying 
prescriptive jurisdiction,107 but not international law. 
 
The array of responses provided for in international law with respect to 
malicious or harmful cyber operations is likewise reserved to states. Private 
entities enjoy no right under international law to conduct countermeasures or 
engage in cyber operations pursuant to the right of self-defense. Consider the 
Sony hack that has been attributed to North Korea.108 The cyber operation 
damaged cyber infrastructure, and, because the operation was conducted by a 
state, violated U.S. sovereignty. Yet the company enjoyed no independent right to 
hack-back against North Korea. Therefore, any response to the North Korean 
operations by Sony would have been governed by the domestic law of all states 
enjoying jurisdiction over that response, the company, the individuals involved, 
and so forth. Of course, the United States could have employed countermeasures 
based on North Korea’s violation of its sovereignty. Moreover, it could have 
empowered Sony or another private entity to act on its behalf in responding to the 
North Korean operations. Had the United States done so, that response would 
have been attributable to it.  
 
It must be cautioned that if a private entity conducts responsive cyber 
operations, the state from which those operations are mounted may be obligated, 
pursuant to the principle of due diligence, to put an end to them. This begs the 
question of whether the territorial state paradoxically must act to protect another 
state from private response when the latter has engaged in an internationally 
wrongful act by directing hostile acts against private entities. The International 
Group of Experts agreed that the latter state is estopped from asserting a breach of 
due diligence in these circumstances.109 
                                                
107 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 8. 
108 For the author’s views on the incident, see Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Cyber 
Attacks: Sony v. North Korea, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 17, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/18460/international-humanitarian-law-cyber-attacks-sony-v-north-
korea/.  
109 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 6, paras. 34–35. 
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II. The Law of Cyber Warfare 
During periods of “armed conflict,” the lex specialis of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) applies to operations with a nexus to the conflict in 
question.110 Of greatest relevance are those IHL rules related to the “conduct of 
hostilities,” especially the law governing targeting. The analysis that follows 
tracks the flow of legal logic that applies when considering the legality of an 
attack under IHL. It begins by assessing when IHL applies and, if so, which 
aspects thereof do so—the law of international or of non-international armed 
conflict.   
 
If IHL applies, the weapons employed must be lawful per se. Even if 
lawful in the abstract, though, weapons may only be used lawfully. This requires 
an assessment of whether the operation in question qualifies as an attack to which 
the conduct of hostilities rules governing attacks attaches. Such rules include 
limits on the tactics employed and the targets attacked. Additionally, they require 
precautions to be taken to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects and 
prohibit attacks that are expected to cause harm to them that is excessive relative 
to the anticipated military advantage likely to accrue from the attack. The 
discussion that follows considers each of these requirements and prohibitions in 
the cyber context. 
 
A. International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
In any IHL analysis, the first question is whether the situation qualifies as 
an armed conflict such that the law applicable in such conflicts attaches. When it 
does not so qualify, peacetime international law, including international human 
rights law and the other legal regimes set forth earlier, governs cyber operations, 
as does the domestic law of any state enjoying prescriptive jurisdiction over the 
matter in question. 
 
There are two forms of armed conflict. An international armed conflict 
exists whenever hostilities occur between two or more states, or when an 
organized group that is conducting hostilities against a state is under the overall 
control of another state.111 By contrast, a non-international conflict is one between 
a state and an organized armed group or between organized armed groups.112  
                                                
110 Id., r. 80. On the application of IHL to cyber operations in an armed conflict, see UN GGE 
2015 Report, supra note 74, para. 28(d); The NATO Wales Summit Declaration, supra note 10, 
para. 72; UN Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 2, 
UN Doc. A/69/112 (June 30, 2014) (Australia); UN Secretary-General, Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, 15, UN Doc. A/68/156 Add. 1 (Sept. 9, 2013) (Japan); Council of the 
European Union, Conclusions, General Affairs Council Meeting, Doc. 11357/13 (June 21, 2013). 
111 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3 r. 82. The accepted articulation of international armed conflict 
is Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
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Cyber operations that take place during ongoing international or non-
international armed conflicts are clearly governed by the IHL applicable in such 
conflicts. The more difficult question is whether an exchange of cyber operations 
may alone initiate an armed conflict.113 Although there is some controversy over 
the threshold of violence necessary to qualify hostilities as international armed 
conflict, the better view is that which was proffered in the ICRC commentary to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions: “Any difference arising between two States and 
leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict . . .  It makes no 
difference how long the conflict lasts or how much slaughter takes place.”114 As 
to the meaning of hostilities, Tallinn Manual 2.0 describes them as “the collective 
application means and methods of warfare.”115 The concept is best understood in 
the cyber context as organized armed forces conducting activities that qualify as 
cyber “attacks” under IHL, a term that is examined below.  
 
Since cyber “attacks” need not be accompanied by conventional military 
operations, it is plausible that a cyber-only international armed conflict could 
occur in the future. It is less likely that a situation involving only cyber operations 
could amount to a non-international armed conflict. The existence of such 
conflicts requires that the group involved be “organized” and that the attendant 
                                                                                                                                
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. On qualification as an 
international armed conflict based on a state’s “overall control” of an organized armed group, see 
Tadic, Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 77, ¶¶ 131–40, 145, 162. 
112 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 83. The accepted articulation of non-international armed 
conflict is Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra 
note 111, art. 3. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 67, 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal]. 
113 The author’s views on the subject are set forth in Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber 
Conflict, 17 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 245 (2012). 
114 INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, 
para. 236 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 GC I Commentary]; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE 
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952); INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK, AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA 
28 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: RELATIVE TO THE 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN 
TIME OF WAR 20 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958). See also Tadić, Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 110, ¶ 
70; DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 3.4.2. 
115 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 82, para. 11. 
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violence reach a high level of intensity.116 The requirement of organization 
excludes cyber operations mounted by small groups or individuals who are not 
operating in concert, even though they might be targeting the same entities. That 
of intensity necessitates cyber operations that are highly destructive or lethal. 
Although the level is ill-defined in IHL, it certainly exceeds the intensity of 
violence during civil disturbances, riots, and the like.117 Merely causing injuries, 
or even some deaths, would not cross the threshold. Given these criteria, the 
prospect of a “cyber-only” non-international armed conflict is low. 
 
An additional factor bearing on the international law governing cyber 
operations is the geography of the armed conflict.118 During an international 
armed conflict, cyber operations from, to, or affecting neutral states are, in 
addition to IHL, subject to the law of neutrality, a topic addressed below. With 
respect to non-international armed conflict, the applicability of IHL beyond the 
territory of the state involved is in dispute.119 By one view, IHL applies to such 
operations wherever they occur, for the existence of the armed conflict, as 
mentioned above, is based on the status of the actors involved and factors such as 
organization and intensity, rather than geography.120 By a second view, IHL only 
applies to operations in the territory of the state and border areas into which the 
hostilities “spill over.”121 The debate has unique relevance in the cyber context 
because most cyber operations during an armed conflict do not rely, as kinetic 
operations usually do, on geographical positioning.  
 
Whether cyber operations are conducted during an international or non-
international armed conflict, the conduct of hostilities analysis is similar. 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which applies for states 
parties in an international armed conflict, sets forth many of the applicable 
                                                
116 Id., r. 83, para. 6; Tadić, Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 112, ¶ 70; Prosecutor v. Milošević, 
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, ¶¶ 16–17 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004); Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17-T, 
Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); 
Prosecutor v. Delalić/Mucić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); 2016 GC I Commentary, supra note 114, para. 
421. On intensity, see especially Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 40–49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 538 (Mar. 14, 2012).  
117 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 83, para. 5; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, art. 1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome 
Statute]. 
118 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 81. 
119 For the author’s view on the matter, see Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of 
Non-International Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 1 (2014). 
120 Harold Hongju Koh, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010). 
121 32nd Int’l Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, International Humanitarian law and 
the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Dec. 8–10, 2015), at 18–19 [hereinafter 
Challenges Report]; 2016 GC I Commentary, supra note 114, paras. 465–82. 
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rules.122 Although treaty based, the Additional Protocol I rules cited below, except 
as otherwise indicated, generally reflect customary international law applicable in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
 
B. Weapon Reviews  
The “means of warfare,” or weapons, used in the conduct of hostilities are 
required to be lawful per se based on their intended use⎯that is, lawful regardless 
of how they are actually used in combat.123 Therefore, states are obliged to take 
steps to ensure that their weapons comply with IHL before they are fielded or 
used.124 This weapon review requirement applies fully to cyber weapons.125 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines such weapons as “cyber means of warfare that are 
used, designed, or intended to be used to cause injury to, or death of, persons or 
damage to, or destruction of, objects, that is, that result in the consequences 
required for qualification of a cyber operation as an attack.”126 The definition of 
“attack” in the context of cyber operations is discussed below. 
 
It is important to note that cyber weapons can be developed during the 
armed conflict, including by fielded units, to exploit vulnerabilities that have been 
just identified or to take advantage of a situation that has presented itself in the 
battlespace. The weapons review requirement applies equally in these 
circumstances. However, because there is no set methodology by which the 
review must be conducted, the International Group of Experts agreed that this 
requirement may be satisfied by an assigned legal officer providing his or her 
evaluation to the commander considering the cyber weapon’s employment.127 
 
As it is a customary law rule, all states must conduct a weapons review of 
cyber weapons prior to acquisition or use. States Parties to Additional Protocol I 
are further required in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of both 
cyber means and “methods” (how a weapon is intended to be employed) of 
warfare to assess whether its employment will comply with any international law 
rules binding on the respective state.128 
 
                                                
122 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
123 This obligation derives from the general requirement that states must conduct their operations 
in accordance with international humanitarian law. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Geneva Conventions I–
IV, supra note 111, common art. 1. 
124 Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 36.  
125 Tallinn Manual, supra note 3, r. 110. See also DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 16.6. 
126 Tallinn Manual, supra note 3, r. 103, para. 2. On the definition of a “cyber attack” under IHL, 
see id., r. 92. 
127 Id., r. 110, paras. 9–10. 
128 Id., r. 110(b); Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 36. 
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Cyber weapons and tactics that are designed, or of a nature, to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are unlawful per se.129 Such weapons 
and tactics needlessly aggravate the suffering of combatants, members of 
organized armed groups, or civilian direct participants in the hostilities (see 
below) without providing the attacker any further military advantage. Historic 
examples include glass-filled projectiles and knives with serrated edges. It is 
difficult to imagine a cyber weapon running afoul of this prohibition. 
 
Much more likely to render a cyber weapon unlawful is the prohibition on 
methods or means of warfare that cannot be directed at specific military 
objectives,130 or that have effects that cannot be limited as IHL requires,131 and 
therefore are susceptible to striking military objectives and civilians or civilian 
objects without distinction. Examples include malware devised for introduction 
into shared networks that is programmed to exploit a vulnerability found in both 
civilian and military systems, when it would have been possible to limit its 
operation to military systems, and malware designed for embedding in online 
websites that are likely to be accessed by both civilian and military personnel (so 
long as the resulting consequences rise to the level of an “attack”).  
 
Lest this prohibition be overstated, it is important to emphasize that if a 
cyber weapon is capable of distinction in the environment in which it is intended 
to be used, it is lawful per se and the question becomes whether it was used 
lawfully once employed. For instance, the spread of a specific type of malware 
may be difficult to control, but if the malware is meant for use in closed military 
networks it would present no obstacle with respect to the weapons review. Should 
it subsequently be used in an indiscriminate fashion, the use would, as will be 
explained, be unlawful. 
 
C. Meaning of the Term “Attack”  
Once it is determined that the proposed cyber weapon and, for states 
Parties to Additional Protocol I, method of cyber warfare is lawful, it is necessary 
to determine whether the planned cyber operation qualifies as an “attack” under 
IHL.132 This is because most rules dealing with the conduct of hostilities are 
expressed in terms of attacks; it is prohibited to “attack” civilians and civilian 
objects, “attacks” that are disproportionate are forbidden, feasible precautions 
must be taken during an “attack” to avoid harm to civilians and civilian objects, 
                                                
129 Tallinn Manual, supra note 3, r. 104; Hague Regulations, supra note 123, art. 23(e); Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 35(2). See also Rome Statute, supra note 117, art. 8(2)(b)(xx); 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, pmbl., Apr. 10, 
1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Convention on the Prohibition on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, pmbl., Dec. 3, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 
211. 
130 Tallinn Manual, supra note 3, r.105(a); Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 51(4)(b). 
131 Tallinn Manual, supra note 3, r.105(b); Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art, 51(4)(c).  
132 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 92. Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 49(1). 
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and so forth (see below). If a cyber operation does not qualify as an attack, rules 
containing the term do not attach. For example, it is lawful to direct cyber 
operations at civilian cyber infrastructure so long as they do not qualify as attacks, 
and no other prohibitory IHL rule applies. The classic case is a psychological 
operation employing social media to undercut civilian support for the enemy 
government and its war effort.133 
 
It is essential to distinguish the term “attack,” which is an IHL term of art, 
from “armed attack,” which, as discussed, applies in the jus ad bellum context and 
is the condition precedent for a state to act in national self-defense. The discussion 
that follows deals solely with attacks in the IHL sense. 
 
The definition of the term “attack” remains unsettled among IHL experts, 
including members of the International Group of Experts.134 Nevertheless, 
common ground exists. It is well accepted that a cyber operation resulting in 
physical damage to objects or injury or death of individuals qualifies.135 This is so 
irrespective of whether the requisite harm is caused to the target of the operation 
or occurs as collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects. To illustrate, a cyber 
operation that damages cyber infrastructure or the systems that rely upon it, as in 
causing machinery to operate in a manner that causes it to break apart, is an 
attack; if the infrastructure or machinery is civilian in character, the operation 
would amount to an unlawful attack on a civilian object.  
 
A majority of the International Group of Experts also took the position 
that the loss of cyber infrastructure’s functionality equates to damage for the 
purpose of defining the term attack.136 This so-called “functionality test” 
encompasses cyber operations that render cyber infrastructure permanently 
inoperative or that necessitate significant repair within the ambit of the term 
“attack.”137  
 
                                                
133 See, e.g., Bryan Lee, The Impact of Cyber Capabilities in the Syrian Civil War, SMALL WARS J. 
(Apr. 26, 2016), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-impact-of-cyber-capabilities-in-the-
syrian-civil-war. 
134 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 92, para. 13. On the author’s views, see Michael N. 
Schmitt, Rewired Warfare: Rethinking the Law of Cyber Attack, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 189 
(2014). See also Challenges Report, supra note 121, at 41–42. 
135 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 92, para. 4. 
136 Id., r. 92, para. 10–11. 
137 For instance, consider the 2015 cyber operations against Ukrainian electrical generation cyber 
infrastructure during the on-going international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. 
Although there may be issues as to attribution, as well as whether the electrical grid concerned 
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permanently inoperable qualifies the operations as an attack. See Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, 
Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016), 
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It should be cautioned in this regard that there is a lack of consensus as to 
consequences falling below this level.138 For instance, the International Group of 
Experts could not agree about cyber operations that necessitate reloading the 
operating system or that delete, corrupt, or alter data that is necessary for purpose-
built cyber infrastructure to perform its intended function. It did agree, however, 
that temporary denial of service operations causing only inconvenience or 
irritation do not constitute attacks and accordingly are not subject to the conduct 
of hostilities rules specifically governing attacks.139 The ICRC has correctly 
observed, for instance, that “the jamming of radio communications or television 
broadcasts has not traditionally been considered an attack in the sense of IHL.”140 
There is no reason to conclude that achieving the same results by cyber means 
should be treated differently. 
 
A cyber operation directed against cyber infrastructure that causes no 
damage or injury to the system itself is nevertheless an attack if it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the attack will indirectly cause damage or injury.141 The 
paradigmatic example of this kind of indirect damage is a cyber operation against 
a dam’s SCADA system that triggers a release of waters to deny the enemy use of 
the flooded area. If individuals downstream drown and property is destroyed, the 
operation amounts to an attack even though the dam has suffered no damage. 
Since the operation is an attack, the rule of proportionality (discussed below), for 
instance, would be highly relevant in assessing its lawfulness. 
 
Cyber operations that do not qualify as attacks may nevertheless be 
unlawful or subject to limitations when the intended target is subject to special 
protection. Such protection extends to, inter alia, medical, religious, humanitarian 
assistance, civil defense, and United Nations personnel, property, and activities; 
detained persons, the wounded and sick, children, and journalists; and cultural 
objects, installations containing dangerous forces, objects indispensable to the 
civilian population, and the environment.142 Certain special protections are 
                                                
138 In deconstructing the debate over the functionality test, the ICRC has usefully catalogued the 
differing views: “One view is to consider that cyber attacks are only those operations that cause 
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dependent on the action necessary to restore the functionality of the object, network or system. A 
third approach is to focus on the effects that the operation has on the functionality of the object.” 
Challenges Report, supra note 121, at 41–42. The author agrees with the ICRC that “designed to 
disable an object—for example a computer or a computer network—constitutes an attack under 
the rules on the conduct of hostilities, whether or not the object is disabled through kinetic or 
cyber means” because “an overly restrictive understanding of the notion of attack would be 
difficult to reconcile with the object and purpose of the rules on the conduct of hostilities.” Id. at 
41. 
139 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 92, para. 14. 
140 Challenges Report, supra note 121, at 42. 
141 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 92, para. 15. 
142 Id., ch. 18. These rules are set forth in various instruments, including: Hague Regulations, 
supra note 123, Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra note 111, Additional Protocol I, supra note 122; 
Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222; 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
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customary in nature and therefore apply to all states.143 Others, such as that 
regarding installations containing dangerous forces,144 are treaty-based and bind 
only states Parties to the respective instruments. 
 
D. Targets 
Once it is determined that a cyber operation qualifies as an attack, the 
target itself must be considered. The fulcrum upon which the law of targeting 
rests is the principle of distinction.145 This customary law principle, reflected in 
article 48 of Additional Protocol I, provides: “In order to ensure respect for and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict 
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”146 By the principle, cyber attacks 
may directly target, as will be explained, only military objectives, combatants, 
members of organized armed groups, and civilians directly participating in 
hostilities.  
 
1. Objects as targets  
The first category of targetable persons and objects, military objectives, 
consists of “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military of advantage.”147 Objects that do not satisfy the definition are civilian 
objects and, as such, are protected from direct attack.148 
                                                                                                                                
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 
(ENMOD), Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 
U.N.T.S. 212. 
143 See 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY 59–158 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, 2005) [hereinafter 
Customary IHL Study]. 
144 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 140; Additional Protocol I, 
supra note 122, art. 54(2). 
145 The principle finds its genesis in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, which provides that “the 
only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy.” Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 29 Nov./11 Dec. 1868, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 
SUPPLEMENT: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 95 (1907). 
146 Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 48; see also Tallinn manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 93. 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, rr. 1, 7. The reference in article 48 to “military objectives” 
is meant to encompass persons and objects that may be lawfully targeted. See Jean S. Pictet et al., 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 
12 AUGUST 1949, para. 1874 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987) [hereinafter 
Additional Protocols Commentary]. The International Court of Justice has labeled distinction a 
“cardinal principle” of IHL. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8, ¶ 78. 
147 Additional Protocol I, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 52(2). This definition 
was adopted in Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100 and 
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Military objectives by nature are those objects that are military in 
character, such as command-and-control facilities, communications equipment, 
radar sites, and the like.149 Civilian objects become military objectives by “use” 
when the enemy uses them for military ends.150 As an example, if the military 
relies in part on a civilian electrical grid or telephone system, those entities 
become military objectives for as long as they are so used. The term “purpose” 
refers to future use.151 For instance, if reliable intelligence is acquired that civilian 
communication systems are going to be used to provide redundancy for military 
systems, the former become military objectives by purpose even before being 
converted to that use. Finally, “location” refers to an area that has become 
militarily significant.152 In the dam example above, the downstream territory that 
is flooded qualifies as a military objective on this basis. 
 
A point of controversy of heightened relevance in the cyber context 
involves so-called “war-sustaining objects.153 It is widely accepted that “war-
fighting” and “war-supporting” objects are lawful targets. Warfighting objects are 
those used to engage in the hostilities, such as military cyber infrastructure. War-
supporting objects directly contribute to the hostilities, although they not used 
during them. Factories producing military equipment are the paradigmatic 
example and accordingly may lawfully be targeted by cyber means.  
 
“War-sustaining” objects only indirectly support the war effort. An 
example would be an industry that provides significant revenue upon which the 
armed conflict depends. This is most likely to be the case in situations where a 
state depends on proceeds or taxes from the industry to fund the war effort, as in 
the case of oil for many oil-exporting states. As an example, cyber infrastructure 
that controls oil storage facilities or a pipeline used for the transshipment of oil is, 
by the war-sustaining approach, a lawful military objectives. The United States 
takes the position that war-sustaining objects are valid targets that may be directly 
attacked.154 A majority of the International Group of Experts rejected the 
                                                                                                                                
appears in many military manuals, including that of the United States. DoD Manual, supra note 
10, para. 5.6.3. As to its customary nature, see Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 8. 
148 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 99; Additional Protocol I, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 52(1). Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 
7. 
149 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100, para. 8. Additional 
Protocols Commentary, supra note 146, para. 2020. 
150 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100, para. 10; Hague 
Regulations, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 27; Additional Protocols 
Commentary, supra note 146, para. 2022. 
151 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100, para. 12; Additional 
Protocols Commentary, supra note 146, para. 2022. 
152 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100, para. 9; Additional 
Protocols Commentary, supra note 146, para. 2021. 
153 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100, paras. 18–19. 
154 DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 5.6.6.2. See also Brian Egan, International Law, Legal 
Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 235, 242 (2016). 
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approach on the basis that the connection between such objects and military 
operations is too attenuated to produce a “definite military advantage.”155 
 
A controversy specific to the cyber operations is the legal nature of 
data.156 When a cyber operation destroys, alters, or manipulates data in a fashion 
that directly leads to physical damage or injury, it qualifies as an attack and is 
therefore subject to the prohibition on attacking civilian objects. However, 
disagreement exists regarding whether the data itself qualifies as an object, such 
that the prohibition on attacking civilian objects applies to it.  
 
Within the International Group of Experts, the majority view was that data 
is intangible and consequently not an object. In the assessment of these Experts, 
the fact that a cyber operation destroys or alters data does not alone qualify that 
operation as an attack and, if the data concerned is civilian in nature, thereby 
render the operation unlawful.157 These experts pointed out that treating data as an 
object would be overbroad in the sense that it would rule out many common cyber 
operations that are engaged in during armed conflict in order to affect civilian 
systems. For example, most psychological operations mounted by cyber means 
against civilian information systems would be prohibited. Yet, such a prohibition 
would run counter to state practice and the understanding of most states that 
employ, or plan on employing, cyber operations during armed conflicts. A 
minority of the experts countered that failing to consider data as an object would, 
as a matter of law, allow a belligerent to conduct highly disruptive (albeit not 
physically harmful) operations against the civilian population.158 To illustrate, the 
interpretation would allow cyber operations that destroy data bases used for 
educational purposes or contain important state pension data.  
 
There is merit in both views. Failure to treat data as an object is under 
inclusive in terms of the protective object and purpose of IHL, whereas doing so 
is over inclusive in the sense that it runs counter to the notion of military necessity 
recognized by that body of law. A possible resolution to this predicament would 
be to recognize that certain “essential civilian functions” rely upon data and merit 
special protection under IHL.159 However, such protection is, in the current state 
of the law, lex ferenda, not lex lata. 
 
                                                
155 Tallinn Manual, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100, para. 19. 
156 The author’s views on the matter are set forth in Michael N. Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects” 
during Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive Precision, 48 ISR. L. REV. 81 
(2015).  
157 Tallinn Manual, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., r. 100, para. 6. The majority 
relied, in part, on the description of an object as something “visible and tangible” in the Additional 
Protocols Commentary supra note 146, paras. 2007–08. 
158 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 100, para. 7. 
159 The author proposed this approach in Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo 
Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 296 (2014). The ICRC appears to support the same 
approach. See Challenges Report, supra note 121, at 43. 
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Finally, the issue of dual-use objects looms large in the cyber context. A 
dual-use object is one that is used for both military and civilian purposes, such as 
submarine communications cables carrying both military and civilian traffic, a 
server farm that stores both civilian and military data, or social media that is used 
to pass intelligence or organize operations. Under IHL, a civilian object becomes 
a military objective when used for military purposes, no matter how slight that 
use. They may be directly targeted, albeit subject to other IHL provisions such as 
the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack.160 
 
2. Persons as targets  
The “object” of a cyber attack is usually cyber infrastructure, rather than 
individuals. Nevertheless, IHL is clear. A cyber operation targeting cyber 
infrastructure that is intended to cause injury to or death of individuals is an attack 
on those individuals. If those individuals are civilians, the attack is unlawful.  
 
Three broad categories of individuals are subject to direct cyber attack 
under IHL161; all others are civilians (or specially protected members of the 
military, like religious and medical personnel and those who are hors de 
combat162) who enjoy legal protection from direct attack.163 The first category 
consists of “combatants” during an international armed conflict, a term that 
includes members of the regular armed forces of a party to the conflict and 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. It also 
encompasses militias and other volunteer corps, including organized resistance 
movements, that belong to a party, are commanded by a person responsible for his 
or her subordinates, wear a distinctive emblem or attire recognizable at distance, 
carry arms openly, and conduct operations in accordance with IHL.164 
 
The second category comprises members of an organized armed group 
during either an international or non-international armed conflict. The group need 
not be recognizable by a distinctive emblem, carry arms openly, or conduct their 
operations in accordance with IHL to qualify as an organized armed group. 
Although its members do not benefit from belligerent immunity or acquire 
prisoner of war status if captured, as combatants do, they are generally treated like 
combatants with respect to targeting rules.165 Thus, it is lawful to conduct cyber 
                                                
160 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 101. 
161 Id., r. 96. Note that members of a levée en masse are also targetable. Id. at rr. 88, 96(d). 
162 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 86, para. 3. Geneva Convention I, supra note 111, arts. 24–
25; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 41. 
163 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 94; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 51(2); 
Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, art. 13(2); Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 1. 
164 Tallinn Manual, supra note 3, r. 87, paras. 4, 5, 96(a); Hague Regulations, supra note 123, art. 
1; Geneva Convention III, supra note 111, art. 4A(1) & (2). Although Geneva Convention III 
deals with prisoner of war status, it is generally understood as accurately denoting combatants for 
targeting purposes. 
165 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 96(b). The concept of an organized armed group in the 
targeting context was first developed in a comprehensive manner in INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
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attacks meant to kill or injure members of organized armed groups, including 
those members who are engaged in cyber activities. A group of organized hackers 
operating collaboratively who are conducting operations at the “attack” level 
likewise qualify as an organized armed group. As the notion of combatancy does 
not extend to non-international armed conflict, fighting forces in such conflicts 
are organized armed groups. 
 
Although there is consensus that members of organized groups are subject 
to cyber attack, disagreement exists as to who constitutes a member for this 
purpose.166 Some members of the International Group of Experts suggested, as 
does the ICRC, that only those members having a “continuous combat function” 
may be targeted at any time.167 A continuous combat function is a position within 
the group that involves activities designed to negatively affect enemy 
operations.168 For instance, group members who are engaged in cyber operations 
against enemy forces would so qualify. Those who do not have a continuous 
combat function, such as individuals responsible solely for administrative 
functions, would become directly targetable only if they directly participate in the 
hostilities (see below).  
 
The other experts rejected the “continuous combat function” approach and 
took the view that membership in the group alone suffices to render an individual 
targetable at any time.169 They pointed out that because combatants are always 
targetable irrespective of the function they serve in the armed forces, it would 
create a pernicious imbalance to treat their opponents, who enjoy no “right” to 
engage in hostilities in the first place, more favorably with respect to 
targetability.170  
 
The final category of targetable persons comprises individuals who are 
neither combatants nor members of an organized armed group, but nevertheless 
directly participate in the hostilities in an ad hoc or spontaneous fashion.171 In the 
cyber context, it would include, for instance, individual hackers targeting military 
cyber infrastructure, multiple hackers who are directing operations against 
common cyber infrastructure but are not acting collaboratively, and persons who 
collect intelligence by cyber means, identify cyber vulnerabilities, or develop 
exploits that they pass on to a party to the conflict. Direct participants in 
                                                                                                                                
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Nils Melzer ed., 2009) [hereinafter Interpretive 
Guidance]. 
166 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 96, para. 4. 
167 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 165, at 27. 
168 Id. at 33. The individual would be classified as a direct participant in hostilities (see below) but 
for membership in the group. 
169 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 96, para. 4.  
170 Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 43(2). The author agrees. See Michael N. Schmitt, 
The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 
1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010). 
171 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, rr. 96(c), 97; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 
51(3); Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, art. 13(3); Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 
6. 
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hostilities may be attacked for such time as they so participate and do not factor 
into the proportionality analysis or need to be considered with respect to the 
taking of precautions in the attack (see below).172  
 
To qualify as direct participation, the act in question must satisfy three 
constitutive elements.173 First, the individual must be engaging in an activity that 
negatively affects, or is intended to negatively affect, an adversary’s military 
operations or capabilities, or that causes injury to civilians or destruction of 
civilian objects. Note that there is no requirement that the cyber operation be 
physically destructive or injurious. For example, a denial of service operation 
directed at enemy military cyber infrastructure would suffice. Second, the act 
must be the direct cause of the harm intended. Consider the case of an individual 
who designs malware and makes it available on-line. The malware is 
subsequently acquired by the enemy and used for cyber attacks. In this case, 
causation is too attenuated to constitute direct participation on the part of the 
malware designer. However, developing custom-made malware to exploit a 
specific enemy vulnerability would amount to direct participation. Finally, the act 
in question must have a belligerent nexus, that is, it must be related to the conflict. 
Cyber crime made possible by the fact that the conflict has hindered a state’s 
ability to conduct law enforcement activities, for instance, would lack the 
requisite nexus. Although the criminality would not have been possible but for the 
armed conflict, it has been engaged in for purely personal reasons. 
 
Unlike combatants and members of organized armed groups, direct 
participants may only be attacked for such time as they so participate.174 This 
limitation has taken on added significance in the cyber context. Some members of 
the International Group of Experts agreed with the ICRC that the “for such time” 
widow means an individual may only be attacked during his or her act of 
participation, while engaged in preparatory measures immediately preceding the 
act, or when deploying to or returning from engaging in it.175 Other experts 
countered that this approach could severely limit the ability to target direct 
participants engaged in cyber operations because such operations may involve 
little immediate preparation, require no deployment, and occur near 
instantaneously. They opined that the “for such time” limitation should be 
interpreted as including the period between the individual’s initial cyber operation 
and the point at which he or she decides to desist altogether from further 
participation.176 Take the individual who conducts attacks once or twice a week 
over a period of several months. By the latter approach, that individual would be 
targetable by either cyber or kinetic means throughout that period. 
                                                
172 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 97, para. 3. 
173 Id. at r. 97, paras. 5–7; Interpretive Guidance, supra note 165, at 46. 
174 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 97, para. 8. The “for such time” limitation appears in the 
text of the relevant law. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 51(3); Additional Protocol 
II, supra note 117, art. 13(3). 
175 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 165, at 70–73. 
176 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 97, para. 8. See also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 177 (2016). 
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3. Doubt  
As explained, objects or persons that do not qualify as, respectively, a 
military objective or directly targetable individuals, are civilian as a matter of law 
and may not be directly attacked. Controversy exists over situations in which the 
status of a person or object is in doubt. Although it has been asserted that no 
presumption of civilian status exists in such cases,177 the International Group of 
Experts concurred that a presumption of civilian status attaches whenever the 
degree of doubt, considering the attendant circumstances, is such that a reasonable 
commander or other responsible official would hesitate to attack. The 
presumption applies to persons generally178 and to “objects ‘normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes’ and any cyber infrastructure upon which they rely.”179 
 
4. Reprisals  
In very limited circumstances, cyber attacks against prohibited targets may be 
permissible as a form of belligerent reprisal.180 Reprisals are unlawful actions 
taken in response to the enemy’s unlawful actions that are intended to cause the 
enemy to desist in its unlawful conduct. That is their sole purpose; retaliation is 
forbidden.181 There are significant limitations and restrictions on the taking of 
reprisals. For example, cyber reprisals against prisoners of war, interned civilians, 
those who are hors de combat, civilians in occupied territory or otherwise under 
the control of an adverse party to the conflict, and medical personnel, facilities, 
vehicles, and equipment are prohibited.182 Additionally, states party to Additional 
Protocol I may not take reprisals against civilians or an assortment of specified 
objects, including civilian objects such as civilian cyber infrastructure.183 
                                                
177 The DoD Manual provision on the subject takes the position that presumptions of civilian 
status are binding only on Parties to Additional Protocol I and that no such presumption appears in 
customary international law. DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 5.4.3.2. 
178 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 95; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 50(1); 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, commentary accompanying r. 6.  
179 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 102; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 52(3); 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, commentary accompanying r. 10. 
180 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 108. There is no legal concept of belligerent reprisals in 
non-international armed conflict. See Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 148; 2016 GC I 
Commentary, supra note 114, paras. 904–905. 
181 FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 33 (2005). 
182 Geneva Convention I, supra note 111, art. 46; Geneva Convention II, supra note 111, art. 47; 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 111, art. 13; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 111, art. 33; 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
art. 3, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 [hereinafter Mines Protocol]; Customary IHL Study, 
supra note 143, r. 146. On the conditions for the taking of reprisals, see Customary IHL Study, 
supra note 143, r. 145 and commentary accompanying r. 145. 
183 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 109; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, arts. 20, 
51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2), 56(4); see also Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
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E. Tactics 
After determining that the target is a lawful one, it is necessary to assess 
the tactics to be employed. Among the tactics that are prohibited, two deserve 
particular attention. First, it is prohibited to conduct indiscriminate cyber attacks. 
An indiscriminate attack is one that is either not directed at a specific lawful target 
or directed at a lawful target without the effects of the attack, in the attendant 
circumstances, being controlled.184 Treating clearly separated and distinct military 
objectives located in a concentration of civilian objects as a single military 
objective is likewise indiscriminate.185 Examples of the three would be, 
respectively, launching cyber attacks while making no attempt to direct them at 
particular cyber infrastructure qualifying as a military objective, launching 
malware designed for use against a closed military network into a military 
network connected to civilian systems, and attacking cyber infrastructure used for 
military and civilian purposes when it would be feasible to target only the military 
aspects thereof. 
 
The second key tactic prohibited by IHL is engaging in perfidy by cyber 
means.186 Perfidy is the killing or injuring of an adversary by engaging in actions 
“that invite the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe he is entitled to, 
or is obliged to accord, protection under [IHL] with intent to betray that 
confidence.”187 For Parties to Additional Protocol I, perfidious conduct resulting 
in capture is also prohibited.188 
 
To constitute perfidy, the act must involve feigning protected status under 
IHL to trick the enemy. A party to the conflict, for example, might send an email 
purporting to be from the ICRC that supposedly arranges for the visit of detainees. 
The expectation of the visit is then exploited by the sender’s force to acquire 
access to the installation and conduct attacks therein. Perfidy must be 
distinguished from ruses, which are lawful and merely intended to mislead the 
enemy or cause it to act recklessly.189 Examples include transmitting false orders 
                                                                                                                                
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, art. 37, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133 (as amended 
May 3, 1996) [hereinafter Amended Mines Protocol]; Mines Protocol, supra note 182, art. 3(2). 
For an example of how a state Party to Additional Protocol I has limited the effect of these 
provisions, see U.K. Statement made upon Ratification of Additional Protocols I and II, para. (m), 
in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 510 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3rd ed., 2000). 
184 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 102; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 51(4)(b) 
and (c); Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, rr. 12, 71. 
185 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 112; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 51(5)(a); 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 13. 
186 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 122; Hague Regulations, supra note 123, art. 23(b); 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 65. 
187 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 122. See also text of Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, 
art. 37(1). 
188 Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 37(1). 
189 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 123; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 37(2); 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 57. 
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to the enemy, creating dummy computer systems to simulate nonexistent forces, 
and using honeynets or honeypots designed to lure the enemy into a cyber trap.190 
Perfidy must also be distinguished from the misuse during cyber operations of 
protective emblems, a prohibition that, unlike perfidy, requires no particular result 
in order to be violated.191 For instance, sending emails containing the ICRC’s Red 
Cross, Red Crescent, or Red Crystal, or another recognized protective emblem, is 
unlawful irrespective of whether the intent is to betray the enemy’s confidence in 
order to conduct an attack.  
 
F. Precautions in Attack 
Even when the cyber weapon to be used is lawful, the target is subject to 
lawful cyber attack, and no forbidden tactics will be employed, an attacker must 
take precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, so long as 
doing so does not sacrifice military advantage.192 This obligation requires an 
attacker to do everything feasible to verify that the target is a military objective, 
choose the methods or means of warfare and the target that will minimize or avoid 
collateral damage, and cancel or suspend an attack should it becomes apparent 
that the target is not a military objective or the operation will breach the rule of 
proportionality.  
 
The requirement to take precautions in attack has special resonance for 
both cyber attacks and the use of cyber assets during a kinetic attack. For instance, 
cyber means may be used to determine the nature of a cyber or kinetic target 
before it is attacked.193 Such means may also be useful in estimating likely 
collateral damage and, following the attack, assessing whether reattack is needed. 
Even more importantly, cyber attacks may be less destructive or injurious than 
their kinetic counterparts,194 as in the case of bringing down an integrated air 
defense system by cyber means rather than attacking associated radars and 
surface-to-air missile sites. Indeed, the availability of cyber capabilities may open 
new target sets, the attack on which may achieve desired effects with less risk of 
                                                
190 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 123, para. 2. See also UK Ministry of Defence, The Joint 
Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, JSP 383, para. 5.17.2 (2004).  
191 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 124; Hague Regulations, supra note 123, art. 23(f); 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 38(1); Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, art. 12; 
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emblem without United Nations approval. Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 125; Additional 
Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 38(2); Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 60. 
192 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, ch. 17, sec. 7; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 57; 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, ch. 5. 
193 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 115; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 57(2)(a)(i); 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 16. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 
Trial Chamber judgment, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
194 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 116; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 
57(2)(a)(ii); Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 17. 
2017 / Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations 277 
collateral damage.195 Consider a situation in which a commander wishes to disrupt 
the resupply of enemy forces by sea. One option would be to bomb the port 
facilities, an attack that may risk depriving the civilian population of food and 
other essentials arriving by sea and endanger those living near the port. However, 
instead of attacking the port facilities, cyber attacks that disrupt cyber 
infrastructure in a hardened facility that controls equipment used to offload 
military supplies could achieve the same effect while minimizing the impact on 
the civilian population.   
 
Pursuant to the requirement to take precautions, an attacker must provide 
effective warning if civilians will be affected by an operation, “unless 
circumstances do not permit.”196 This requirement could include both warnings by 
cyber means of a kinetic attack, as in the case of text messages that urge the 
civilian population to take shelter in anticipation of an aerial attack, and warnings 
by cyber or other means of a cyber attack that poses danger for the general 
population. It must be emphasized that the requirement is subject to a condition of 
feasibility.197 For instance, if warning of a cyber attack will alert the enemy in 
time to allow it to fashion an effective defense, the warning need not be issued.  
 
G. Proportionality 
The final step in the cyber targeting process is determining whether the 
cyber attack comports with the rule of proportionality. Pursuant to that rule, “a 
cyber attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited.”198 Note that on its face the rule requires only the consideration of 
physical harm or injury; accordingly, mere inconvenience, irritation, stress or fear 
does not factor into a proportionality analysis.199 Consider a denial of service 
attack against a military objective that interferes with civilian email services. The 
interference need not be considered when assessing whether damage caused by 
the attack is excessive relative to the attack’s intended military gain. However, 
recall that in the context of the definition of an attack, deprivation of functionality 
qualifies as damage. In the same fashion, loss of the functionality of civilian cyber 
infrastructure is collateral damage for the purposes of the rule of proportionality. 
 
                                                
195 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 118; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 57(3); 
Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 21. 
196 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 120; Hague Regulations, supra note 123, art. 26; 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, art. 57(2)(c); Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 20. 
197 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 120, para. 8; Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 
146, para. 2223. 
198 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 113; Additional Protocol I, supra note 122, arts. 51(5)(b), 
57(2)(iii). See also Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 7, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212; 
Amended Mines Protocol, supra note 182, art. 3(8); Mines Protocol, supra note 182, art. 3(3). See 
also Customary IHL Study, supra note 143, r. 14; Challenges Report, supra note 121, at 42–43. 
199 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 113, para. 5. 
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Both direct and indirect effects may qualify as collateral damage, an 
important consideration given the networked nature of cyber activities.200 Thus, it 
is not only damage to civilian objects or injury to civilians caused by the initial 
effect of the cyber attack on the targeted cyber infrastructure that must be 
considered, but also any damage or injury to objects or persons that rely on such 
infrastructure or would otherwise be affected by damage to it. For instance, 
interference with a dual use communication system in a major metropolitan area 
could result in the disruption of emergency services. To the extent such disruption 
would foreseeably interfere with the treatment of injured persons, the likely harm 
to them would factor into the expected collateral damage assessment. 
 
With respect to calculating the proportionality of a cyber attack, note that 
the collateral damage to be considered is that which was, or should have been, 
reasonably anticipated by those involved in the attack at the time they made their 
proportionality determination. The same is true with respect to the anticipated 
military advantage of an attack. In other words, compliance with the rule of 
proportionality is judged ex ante, not post factum.201 The fact that a cyber attack 
results in collateral damage that is excessive relative to the eventual military 
advantage achieved does not render the attack unlawful so long as the attacker’s 
judgment that it would not be excessive was reasonable in the circumstances. This 
caveat is especially significant with respect to cyber attacks because of the 
difficulty of surgically estimating likely collateral damage. 
 
Finally, it must also be cautioned that IHL does not expressly define the 
term excessive. It has been suggested that extensive collateral damage is 
necessarily excessive.202 A majority of the International Group of Experts 
concluded that this assertion misapprehends the law. On the one hand, if a cyber 
attack causes only slight damage or injury, but accrues little military advantage, it 
may violate the rule of proportionality. On the other, a cyber attack may cause 
significant damage or injury, but not violate the rule of proportionality because 
the military advantage resulting from the attack is great. 
 
H.  Neutrality 
Cyber operations into or from neutral territory during an international 
armed conflict are subject to additional analysis due to applicability of the law 
neutrality.203 To begin with, it has long been undisputed that belligerent states are 
                                                
200 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 113, para. 6. See also United States Submission to the 
United Nations Group of Government Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2014, at 737; DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 16.5.1.1. 
201 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 113, para. 11; Galić, supra note 193, ¶¶ 58–60; Trial of 
Wilhelm List and Others (The Hostages Trial), Case No. 47, VIII Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals 34, 69 (UN War Crimes Commission 1948) (the so-called “Rendulic Rule”). 
202 Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 146, para. 1980. 
203 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, ch. 20; Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter 
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prohibited from exercising in neutral territory belligerent rights, which involve, 
inter alia, the conduct of military operations against the enemy.204 Thus, if a 
belligerent engages in cyber operations related to the armed conflict from neutral 
territory, it has breached neutrality. Similarly, a belligerent may not conduct 
remote operations from outside the neutral state, as in the case of remotely taking 
control of neutral cyber infrastructure, whether government or private in nature, 
and use it to launch cyber attacks against its enemy.  
 
In the cyber context, the pressing issue is when may a belligerent that has 
been targeted by cyber operations conducted from or through neutral territory 
respond by conducting its own cyber (or kinetic) operations into that territory. 
The International Group of Experts agreed that “if a neutral State fails to 
terminate the exercise of belligerent rights on its territory, the aggrieved party to 
the conflict may take such steps, including by cyber operations, as are necessary 
to counter that conduct.”205 Before an aggrieved belligerent may do so, the 
violation of neutrality by its adversary must have serious consequences and 
represent an immediate threat for that belligerent.206 Mere inconvenience or 
irritation, even of a military nature, does not suffice. Effectively disrupting 
ongoing military operations or conducting cyber attacks would clearly cross the 
threshold. 
 
The right of the neutral state to be free of belligerent cyber operations on 
its territory comes with a corresponding obligation to not knowingly allow them 
to occur.207 The neutral state is entitled to take cyber measures to meet this 
obligation, but may not exceed those that are reasonably necessary to do so given 
the circumstances. If the neutral state is willing and able to act to put an end to the 
offending cyber operations, the aggrieved belligerent must defer to it in handling 
the situation.208 Should the neutral state fail to comply with its obligation, the 
belligerent must warn, if feasible, the neutral to do so before acting. As a practical 
matter, this may not be possible because of the speed with which cyber operations 
can unfold.209 If the neutral state is still unwilling or unable to address the 
situation, the belligerent may take those cyber or kinetic measures that are 
required to put an end to the offending cyber operations. In that the neutral state is 
protected by the law of neutrality and the principle of sovereignty, any belligerent 
operations must be strictly limited to those necessary to terminate its opponent’s 
operations and comply fully with IHL rules. 
                                                                                                                                
Hague Convention V]; Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in 
Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague Convention XIII]. 
204 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 151; Hague Convention V, supra note 203, arts. 2, 3; 
Hague Convention XIII, supra note 203, arts. 2, 5.  
205 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 153. See also DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 15.4.2. 
206 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 153, paras. 3 & 4. See analogously in the maritime warfare 
context, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, san Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, r. 22 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). 
207 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 152, Hague Convention V, supra note 203, art. 5. 
208 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 3, r. 153, para. 4. 
209 Id., r. 153, para. 5. 
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Conclusion 
It is risky to set forth flowcharts and abstract analysis that might guide a 
state’s cyber actions or its assessment of those conducted by other states and non-
state actors. A particular cyber incident may have features that render it ill-fitted 
to analytical guidelines developed for paradigmatic clear-cut cases. Indeed, as was 
demonstrated in the Russian hacking of the U.S. election, actors in cyberspace 
will actively search for gray areas of international law within which to operate. 
 
Therefore, this vade mecum must conclude with three cautionary notes. 
First, practitioners and academics have to be alert to the possibility that the cyber 
incident being analyzed does not fit neatly into this model. It is meant only to 
apply in a general sense. They should think of it as providing vector, not a precise 
route, through the legal morass that surrounds such incidents. Second, the analysis 
set forth is merely a skeleton of a highly complex body of law. Therefore, 
resorting to Tallinn Manual 2.0, upon which much of the discussion is based, is 
recommended since that work provides a highly granular treatment of the legal 
issues. Finally, it must be emphasized that our understanding of how international 
law applies to cyber operations is in its infancy; many issues lack clarity or are the 
subject of important disagreement, a point that important to bear in mind when 
deconstructing operations into their legal components. This caveat should be of 
special resonance for state legal advisors, for their advice will shape the legal 
policies that will in turn refine and develop the law governing cyberspace through 
state practice and expressions of opinio juris.210 
 
 
 
                                                
210 On the criticality of state practice and expressions of opinion juris regarding cyber operations, 
see Michael N. Schmitt and Sean Watts, Beyond State Centrism: International Law and Non-State 
Actors in Cyberspace, 21:3 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 1 (2016). 
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